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Abstract 
 
This study examines whether differences in monetary policy are associated with 
diverging effects of public spending on growth. At first stage, we estimate public 
spending multipliers for each country of the European Union (EU). Their size varies 
considerably across countries. Then we incorporate in the analysis the role of 
monetary policy and examine whether real interest rates affect the relationship 
between public spending and growth. The main result of the econometric analysis is 
that government spending can affect growth positively only when real interest rates 
become negative. This result remains robust to several changes in the econometric 
specification and measures of interest rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the 2007-2008 crisis, the response of fiscal policy became highly 
expansionary in several countries. A lot of European Union (EU) economies adopted 
fiscal stimulus measures to address weaknesses in the financial sector and restore 
aggregate demand. During the same period, central banks reduced nominal interest 
rates to unprecedented levels as a means to increase liquidity in the private sector. 
Real interest rates still remain negative for most EU countries. 
As a result fiscal positions of many countries deteriorated leading to higher 
public sector deficits and rapid accumulation of government debt.  At a later stage, the 
fiscal policy stance shifted into a restrictive regime across several EU countries in 
response to the deepening of the sovereign debt crisis. Figure 1 briefly illustrates the 
percentage of GDP that each EU country allocates to public spending in the form of 
public consumption and public investment.  
The question that arises is whether and to what extent has fiscal policy of 
recent years affected growth of EU countries? And if so, is this effect uniform across 
countries? This paper tries to answer this question by putting emphasis on the role of 
monetary policy in shaping the relation between public spending and growth. This 
study relates to a number of recent studies having examined the impact of fiscal 
policy in the USA using structural Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
models. We try to empirically answer the same question for a number of EU 
countries.  
Αt first stage we follow the approach of Balnchard and Perotti (2002) to set up 
a structural VAR econometric framework and estimate multipliers of public spending. 
Quarterly time series datasets are compiled for each EU country. The obtained 
econometric results confirm that responses of output after a shock in government 
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spending are not uniform and vary significantly across EU countries. The influence on 
output is positive for the majority EU countries. However it remains low or becomes 
even negative for fewer ones.    
Next we incorporate in the analysis the role of monetary policy. Based on 
annual cross country data covering the period 2004-2014, we examine whether the 
real interest rate affects the relationship between public spending and growth. The 
main result that arises from the econometric analysis is that monetary policy indeed 
matters in shaping the influence of public spending on growth. It is shown that its 
impact on output can be effective only when real interest rates become negative. This 
result remains robust to several changes in the econometric specification and 
measures of monetary policy.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the findings of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 estimates fiscal multipliers for EU countries. Section 4 discusses 
the role of monetary policy in the EU. Section 5 examines the influence of the real 
interest rate on the public spending-growth relation. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
This study is related to a large literature which examines the effects of fiscal policy on 
growth. Predictions of the literature are ambiguous as regards the influence of public 
spending on growth. General equilibrium new Keynesian models show that the 
government spending multiplier can be close or above one (Gali et al. 2007; 
Monacelli and Perotti 2008). On the other hand, standard real business cycle models 
are in sharp contrast to new Keynesian ones and deliver multipliers which are well 
below one (Baxter and King 1993; Burnside et al. 2004; Ramey 2011). The main 
reason for such significant variation is that real business cycle models feature 
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infinitely lived Ricardian households, whose consumption depends on an 
intertermporal budget constraint. Therefore any increase in government spending 
lowers the present value of income after taxes, generates negative wealth effects and 
leads to a decrease in consumption. 
2
 
Similarly, predictions of the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy 
are not uniform. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that shocks in government 
spending are associated with higher output of the US economy during the post war 
period, with the size of the multiplier being close to one. Monacelli et al. (2010) 
estimate a VAR model to evaluate the effects of U.S. government spending on output 
and employment. Their results are in favor of a multiplier which is larger than one.  
On the contrary, a part of the literature has identified non Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy on output. Perotti (1999) evidenced several countries whose private 
consumption increased rather than contracted in periods of large fiscal consolidation 
and showed that in such periods the influence of fiscal policy is very different than in 
‘normal’ times. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) showed that fiscal stimulus based on tax 
cuts is more likely to increase growth as compared to fiscal expansion based on 
spending increases. They also showed that adjustments based on spending cuts rather 
than tax increases are less likely to create recessions. In the same spirit Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009) showed that deficit financed government spending has weaker effects on 
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 Several studies have tried to reconcile predictions of neoclassical models with observed evidence 
which were in favor of a raise in consumption after an increase in government spending. Gali et al. 
(2007) extended a standard new Keynesian model to allow for the co-existence of infinite horizon 
Ricardian consumers and ‘rule of thumb’ consumers, which do not save and do not borrow. They 
showed that an interaction of rule of thumb consumers with sticky prices and deficit financing of 
government spending can account for higher consumption when spending increases. In a similar way, 
Hall (2009) developed a dynamic general equilibrium model which has as main features the decline in 
markups of prices over costs when output raises and the elastic response of employment when demand 
increases. With these features the model delivers quite high multipliers and increase in consumption. 
Recently, Cogan et al. (2010) showed that government spending multipliers are much smaller in new 
Keynesian models than old Keynesian ones, with the estimated stimulus in GDP being one sixth of 
what is predicted in old Keynesian ones.   
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output of the US economy as compared to deficit financed tax cuts. It seems, 
however, that the impact of fiscal policy on private consumption and output has 
become weaker over time, with the influence being stronger in the pre 1980 period 
(Perotti 2005; 2007).  
Another part of the literature shows that the response of output depends on 
country specific characteristics related to the exchange rate regime, trade openness, 
level of development and public sector debt (Chung and Leeper 2007; Favero and 
Giavazzi 2007; Ilzetzki et al. 2013). A number of recent studies has demonstrated that 
the stance of monetary policy matters in determining the growth influence of public 
spending. Christiano et al. (2011) show that the government spending multiplier can 
be very large when monetary policy does not respond to changes in prices, mostly in 
cases when the nominal interest is very close to zero. In contrast, when the central 
bank follows a Taylor rule, then the value of the government spending multiplier is 
less than one. 
Davig and Leeper (2011) used o DSGE model with price nominal rigidities 
and Markov-switching rules for U.S. monetary and fiscal policy. They showed that 
the influence of fiscal policy depends on whether monetary policy remains passive or 
becomes active. The highest response of output occurs when fiscal policy is 
expansionary while the central bank policy rate remains unchanged to price increases. 
Eggertsson (2011) examined the influence of fiscal policy when the short-term 
nominal interest rate is zero by using a standard new Keynesian DSGE model. His 
main result implies that cutting taxes on labor or capital is contractionary as it leads to 
deflationary pressures and increases in the real interest rate. On the contrary, the 
effect of a temporal increase in government spending is large and much larger than 
under normal circumstances. Conenen et al. (2012), using seven different structural 
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DSGE models, showed that fiscal policy, especially in the form of public spending 
and targeted transfers, is effective in raising output when monetary policy remains 
accommodative. Moreover, they showed that fiscal policy is mostly effective when it 
has moderate persistence, while a permanent increase in public spending implies 
significantly lower fiscal multipliers.  
 
3. Public investment multipliers 
A common approach to study the effects of fiscal policy on output is to use a standard 
VAR model. We start with estimating the following reduced form VAR for each EU 
country:  
ttt UZLAZ  1)(   (1) 
where ),,( tttt ytgZ   is the vector of endogenous variables. This specification 
includes quarterly data on the logs of government spending (gt), defined as 
government consumption plus government investment, taxes net of government 
transfers (tt) and GDP (yt), with all four variables entering in real terms. 
3
 All 
variables are seasonally adjusted except the GDP deflator and the interest rate. )(LA  
is the autoregressive polynomial in the lag operator L and ),,( yt
t
t
g
tt uuuU    is the 
vector which contains the reduced form residuals. 
A major drawback of the standard VAR specification is that if covariance 
between error disturbances is not zero, which is often the case, then the common 
component of error innovations is falsely attributed to the first variable entering the 
VAR. In order to avoid this kind of bias, after estimating the reduced form model of 
equation (1), we proceed with the estimation of a structural VAR specification to 
                                                 
3
 Several other relevant variables (such as the inflation rate, the current account or the interest rate) 
could be included in vector Z. However, limited availability of data across time did not allow us to 
utilize more than 3 variables in our model. 
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identify exogenous fiscal policy shocks. These shocks are then used to derive impulse 
responses of output. More details on the construction of the structural VAR model are 
found in the Appendix. 
For each EU country, except Croatia, Greece and Lithuania for which the data 
availability is very limited, we have compiled quarterly data from the National 
Accounts’ database of Eurostat (2014),. The length of the time span that data covers 
all variables differs across countries.
4
 We have estimated a single VAR model, one 
for each country, with the optimal number of lags varying across different models. As 
results often change depending on the number of chosen lags, we set this number 
equal to 4, as a way to assure that differences across countries are not driven by 
differences in the number of chosen lags. 
After the estimation of the structural VAR’s, a series of simulations was 
performed to trace the impact of shocks in public spending. The shocks were set equal 
to a positive one standard deviation in the residual of public spending. The impact of 
these shocks on output is illustrated with impulse responses shown in Figure 2 along 
with their two standard error confidence intervals. Cumulative public spending 
multipliers are shown in Table 1 and are defined as the ratio of the cumulative change 
in output y until period t, divided by the median interest rate i, over the magnitude of 
the change in the public the spending variable g in period t=0  
Public investment multiplier = 
)(
))1(*)((
0
1
1





t
n
t
t
g
iy
  (2)
 
For most of the EU countries, we observe that the sign of the government 
spending multiplier is positive, implying that an increase of public expenditures 
                                                 
4
 For most countries data start either in the first quarter of 1999 or in the first quarter of 2002. Further 
information is available upon request.  
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brings about a positive response of GDP. The highest response of output is observed 
in Germany, Finland, Sweden and Luxemburg for which multipliers remain above 2 
eight quarters after the initial shock. For a number of other EU countries we have 
been provided with positive multipliers which are below one. We also encounter a 
few countries for which the sign of their multiplier is negative.  
Overall, the size and statistical significance (see Figure 2) of fiscal multipliers 
varies significantly across EU countries implying significant differences on the way 
the economies are affected by a shock in government spending. The existing 
empirical literature has proposed a number of reasons for which the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy differentiates from country to country. In this paper we will try to 
examine whether the economic outcome of fiscal policy depends on country 
characteristics related to monetary policy. 
 
4. Monetary policy in the EU 
The primary goal of this section is to briefly illustrate monetary policy developments 
that took place in the EU during the last 10 years. In contrast to other central banks, 
the main policy objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to maintain price 
stability in the euro area. Further goals of the ECB also include economic growth and 
financial sector stability. In Figure 3 we observe that pre-crisis real short term interest 
rates were fairly positive in the majority of the EU economies, with the exception of 
some countries from eastern Europe. Monetary policy conditions during this period 
were strict in an attempt of most central banks to fight increasing inflation, mainly 
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pushed by continuing increases in oil and food prices. This policy seemed to work 
until the end of 2008 when the global financial crisis hit the world economy.
5
  
In the years following the subprime and the sovereign debt crisis, monetary 
policy became the main policy tool to tackle financial instability. However, 
persistence of low inflation rates as well as ongoing economic depression in the 
majority of EU countries have brought ECB as well as other central banks in the area 
of unconventional policies in which nominal interest rates are kept constant at very 
low levels for prolonged periods. We observe from Figure 4 that real short term 
interest rates are now negative for the majority of countries in the EU area. Figure 5 
also shows that long term interest rates in most EU countries are close or lower than 
2%.   
It seems that the main policy objective of the ECB during the last years has 
been to stimulate economic growth and raise the inflation rate which remains close to 
zero for a long period. Persistence of very low nominal interest rates reflects 
weaknesses of many industrialized countries to get back to economic recovery. 
Absence of strong confidence in the private sector as regards future economic 
developments as well as short expectations for higher aggregate demand have kept 
shares of private capital formation to their pre crisis levels in the great majority of EU 
countries. In such a situation, central banks of most countries try to keep their policy 
rates at low levels to stimulate economic recovery. However, in other countries, 
prevalence of low interest rates might reflect their primary policy to prevent currency 
form rising. 
 
                                                 
5
 It should be notices, the application of a single monetary policy in a diverse economic area entailed 
pro-cyclicality phenomena in a number of countries in the euro area periphery. In the first years of the 
euro, the monetary base was growing more rapidly in the euro area periphery, while in years after the 
advent of the crisis it also fell more steeply in the periphery (Micossi 2015). 
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5. Public spending, monetary policy and growth 
5.1 Econometric model, data and variables  
The obtained fiscal multipliers suggest that responses of output after a shock in public 
spending are not uniform across countries. A meaningful explanation for such 
variation might be related to differences in monetary policy as reflected by the level 
of the real interest rate. 
 The general empirical model used to study the relation between public 
spending, monetary policy and growth is the following: 
ititititititit upubaapubaagrowth  int*int 3210   (3) 
where growthit is the GDP growth rate of country i at time t, pubit is the share of GDP 
allocated to public spending in the form of public consumption and public investment 
and intit is the level of the real interest rate. We wish to examine whether the value of 
the real interest rate affects the impact of public spending on growth and, therefore, 
we include in our model the interaction term of public spending with the real interest 
rate pubit*intit.  X is a set of other macroeconomic variables which are expected to 
influence economic growth and uit is the stochastic disturbance. We follow the 
literature and include in vector X the variables of private investment, tax revenues and 
trade (exports plus imports), all of them denoted as shares of GDP. We further include 
the variables of tertiary school enrollment rate, the logarithm of lagged GDP and the 
lagged growth rates of GDP, to control for convergence effects as well as for dynamic 
influences of past growth, respectively. Vector X also includes time and country 
specific effects, in the form of dummy variables, to account for time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity and common macroeconomic shocks.  
 We work with annual data for 28 EU countries which cover the period 2004-
2014. The variable of the growth rate of GDP is provided by the Penn World Table 
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8.0 Database (see Feenstra et al. 2013). Real GDP of countries is expressed at 
constant 2005 chained PPP dollars. PWT also provides us with the variable of trade, 
while the variables of public spending (expressed as the sum of public consumption 
and public investment) and total investment were provided by the National Accounts 
of Eurostat.  Tertiary school enrollment rates and tax revenues were provided by the 
World Development Indicators (2015). As for the real interest rate variable we use 
several measures provided by the AMECO Database (2015).    
 
5.2 Basic results 
When estimating Equation (3), a possible source of bias could be the existence of 
unobserved country specific factors which affect growth and are contemporaneously 
related to policy decisions regarding public spending. In such a case the econometric 
estimates could be subject to an estimation bias. We have chosen to use the system 
GMM panel data estimator (see Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) 
which is the augmented version of the first difference panel data estimator (Arellano 
and Bond 1991). This estimator eliminates such country specific effects and controls 
for the presence of endogeneity in covariates included in Equation (3). It has been 
designed for panel datasets with many panels and few periods as is the case for our 
model. Instead of the one step estimator, we chose the two step estimator, since it is 
asymptotically more efficient than the one step estimator and its standard covariance 
matrix is robust to panel specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. We use its 
robust version to get the corrected covariance matrix. 
 Column 1 of Table 2 reports the results when the identification strategy 
involves only the variable of public spending, time specific and country specific 
effects. We have allowed for endogeneity of public spending which entails the use of 
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its lagged levels as instruments in the regression. As a rule of thumb for the choice of 
the number of lags, we chose to keep it at low levels, as a large number of instruments 
could lead to biased diagnostic tests. Therefore, the public spending variable was 
instrumented with its once lagged level. The results of the first column clearly suggest 
that public spending does not affect significantly economic growth.  
Columns 2-4 present econometric estimates after successively including in the 
model the variables of the real short run interest rate, its interaction with public 
spending and private investment. We construct a multiplicative term between the 
variable of public spending and the short run interest rate. Given that their correlation 
might be high, these variables are mean centered (new variables are generated by 
subtracting their means). In such a way, we are allowed to interpret the coefficient of 
government spending at the average level of the short term interest rate rather than at 
the point where it is zero. The results of columns 3-4 in Table 2 show that the 
interaction term enters the estimated equation with a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient. This implies that in countries where the real interest rate is 
high, the growth impact of public spending is inferior. The coefficient estimates of the 
interaction variable are -0.023 and -0.027 (column 3 and column 4, respectively). 
These point estimates will be used later to assess the growth contribution of public 
spending at various levels of the short run interest rate. 
The estimates of Table 2 confirm that the impact of private investments on 
growth is positive and statistically significant. The variable of the short run interest 
rate is negative and statistically significant only in the estimates shown in column 2. 
Its influence on growth becomes statistically insignificant in the estimates shown in 
columns 3-4.  
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The system GMM panel data estimator reports several diagnostic tests. The 
first one is the Hansen test which tests for the validity of instrumental variables. The 
hypothesis being tested is that they are uncorrelated with the residuals and therefore 
are acceptable instruments. The GMM estimator also reports a test for autocorrelation, 
which is applied to the first differenced residuals. If the null of no autocorrelation is 
rejected, then the test indicates that lags of the used instruments are in fact 
endogenous and thus are considered as weak instruments. The results of both tests 
verify that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals and that no 
autocorrelation exists in the first differenced residuals.  
 
5.3 Robustness analysis 
We examine the robustness of the obtained results by extending the empirical 
specification. We first test whether the inclusion of other relevant macroeconomic 
variables affects the obtained results. Next, we examine whether estimates remain 
unchanged when including the long run interest rate instead of the short run interest 
rate in the baseline specification.  
The robustness analysis is conducted on model 4 of Table 2, which is our 
preferred model specification. In the first five columns of Table 3 we report results 
when the baseline specification involves the variables of the volume of trade, tax 
revenues (both expressed as shares of GDP), the variable of the tertiary school 
enrolment rate, the lagged level of GDP and the once lagged GDP growth rate. We 
also test whether the choice for the number of lags as instruments for the variable of 
public spending affects the obtained results. Therefore we repeat econometric 
estimates when the specification includes two lags as instruments for the variable of 
public spending. We also report results after treating the variable of private 
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investment as endogenously determined, as it might be affected by past outcomes of 
growth or may be correlated with the error term. Finally, we report results when GDP 
growth is regressed on the once lagged level of the short run interest rate. In such a 
way we control for reverse causality between economic growth and monetary policy. 
The obtained results for most variables remain practically unchanged. The coefficient 
estimates of the interaction variable between public spending and the interest rate 
remain statistically significant and range between -0.015 and -0.031 across various 
specifications. 
Table 4 repeats the econometric estimates shown in Tables 2 and 3 when the 
baseline specification involves the real long run interest rate instead of the short run 
policy rate. Although reported estimates on the variables of public spending and long 
run interest rate are not always statistically significant, their multiplicative term 
remains negative and statistically significant for most econometric specifications.  
Public consumption and public investment are likely to entail quite different 
influences on output. In order to control for varying influences of these components 
on GDP, the baseline specification is further elaborated by breaking down the variable 
of total public spending to the variables of public consumption and public investment. 
Estimates of Table 5 show that output is mostly affected by government consumption 
whose impact on growth is negative and statistically significant in all specifications. 
The influence of public investment on growth is positive but not statistically 
significant while coefficient estimates of the interactions of public spending, public 
consumption and public investment with the interest rate remain negative and 
statistically significant. 
As a final check, we explore whether coefficient estimates of interactions of 
public spending with the interest rate differentiate at various growth regimes. Without 
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using any formal technique, we have created three dummy variables which identify 
three different growth regimes.  The first one proxies for low or negative growth rates 
and receives ones when the variable of the GDP growth rate is below 1%. The second 
one accounts for medium growth rates, between 1% and 3% and the third one for 
relatively high growth rates, above 3%. Table 6 reports econometric estimates based 
on interactions of these dummy variables with the multiplicative terms of public 
spending with the interest rate. All interactions of these dummy variables with 
multiplicative terms remain negative. However the only statistically significant 
interaction term is based on the dummy variable which proxies for low and negative 
growth regime, indicating that a combination of high public spending and 
expansionary monetary policy is relevant only when GDP growth rates are low or 
negative. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
The interpretation of the main coefficient of public spending (a1) is its effect on 
growth when the real interest rate is zero. This becomes evident when taking the 
partial derivative of equation (3) with respect to public spending:   
             it
it
it
pub
growth
int*
)(
)(
31  


 (4) 
Similarly, when estimating a model with interaction terms, the resulting output of 
standard errors is misleading. We re-calculate standard errors of public spending 
conditional on various levels of the real interest rate (int=xj) with the following 
formula: 
2
1
3113
2
1intint
]),cov[2]var[](var[
31
aaxaxas jxaa j


 (5) 
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We get a more realistic insight into the influence of public spending on growth 
by using equations (4-5) as well as regression results reported in Table 2 (column 4). 
The variances and co-variance matrix in (5) are directly obtained from the variance-
covariance matrix in the original output. 
 Figure 6 provides us with estimates of the growth contribution of public 
spending (vertical axis) at various levels of the real short term interest rate (horizontal 
axis) along with its two standard error confidence intervals. We observe that the 
impact of public spending is positive and statistically significant only at negative 
levels of the real interest rate. However, as its value increases at levels higher than 
zero the growth impact of fiscal policy becomes negative, implying that monetary 
policy really matters when assessing the growth contribution of public spending.  
It seems that the influence of government spending on output can become 
large when monetary policy does not respond to changes in fiscal policy, mostly in 
cases when the nominal interest is close to zero. In such a case, an increase in 
government spending leads to an initial rise in output. With nominal interest rates held 
constant at zero, the expected rise in inflation drives down the real interest rate. Thus, 
private spending increases and this in turn leads to a further increase of output. On the 
contrary, when monetary policy responds by increasing the nominal interest rate the 
impact of public spending on growth becomes lower. 
The main policy lesson to be learned from this study is that fiscal policy can 
be an effective tool for raising output in periods when the nominal interest rates 
approach the zero lower bound or when the economies suffer from insufficient 
demand. In such cases, economic policy should focus on ways to increase government 
spending. On the other hand fiscal policies that expand supply, via cuts in direct 
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income taxation, may induce deflationary pressures and bring about negative effects 
on growth.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether differences in real interest rates 
account for the influence of public spending on growth of EU countries. The 
associated fiscal multipliers confirm that the response of output after a shock in 
government spending is positive for the majority EU countries. However, significant 
disparities exist between countries on the magnitude of public spending multipliers. 
Panel data econometric results show that the influence of government 
expenditure on growth can be positive and significant only when the real interest rates 
become negative. This result remains robust to several changes in the econometric 
specification and measures of monetary policy. 
The impact of fiscal policy on growth is still an open issue. Further research 
may focus on which components of GDP are mostly affected by expansionary fiscal 
policy or on whether country specific factors related to bureaucracy or corruption 
account for the influence of fiscal policy. 
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Appendix 
Relying on Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005), the reduced form 
residuals for government spending g
tu and taxes 
t
tu can be expressed as a linear 
function of: (a) automatic responses to movements in the variable of GDP, (b) 
discretionary response of fiscal policy to macroeconomic news and (c) random 
exogenous fiscal policy shocks ( g
te ,
t
te ). The latter components are the structural 
shocks in government spending and taxes that we try to indentify in order to measure 
responses of output. The reduced form residuals for government spending g
tu , and net 
taxes t
tu can be represented as: 
g
t
t
ttg
y
tyg
g
t eeuau  ,,      (A1) 
t
t
g
tgt
y
tyt
t
t eeuau  ,,      (A2) 
In order to recover structural residuals from the reduced form VAR, we need 
to have estimates for the ai,j’s and βi,j’s.  The use of quarterly data allows us to set the 
contemporaneous response of discretionary fiscal policy to innovations in GDP equal 
to zero, since it takes more than a quarter to approve and implement new measures. 
Therefore, the ai,j’s coefficients in equations (A1) and (A2) only reflect automatic 
responses of fiscal variables  to movements in the variable of GDP. 
The output elasticity of government spending ag,y is set equal to zero, as there 
is no evidence in favor of any substantial response of this variable to changes in GDP, 
within one quarter. The output elasticities of net taxes have been obtained from Veld 
et al. (2012).
6
 Once output and price elasticities have been obtained, the fiscal shocks 
can be expressed in the following way: 
g
t
t
ttg
y
tyg
g
t eeuau  ,,      (A3) 
                                                 
6
 In countries for which we do not have available the elasticities of taxes to GDP, we use the average of 
the Euro area countries. 
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t
t
g
tgt
y
tyt
t
t eeuau  ,,      (A4) 
We have assumed that spending decisions come first and taxes follow so that
0, tg . The reduced form residuals for GDP are a linear combination of fiscal 
variable shocks: 
y
t
t
tty
g
tgy
y
t euuu  ,,    (A5) 
 The final econometric specification can be written as: 
AUt=BVt  (A6) 
where ),,( yt
t
t
g
tt eeeV    is the vector including orthogonal structural shocks, with:
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Tables and figures 
Figure 1 Public spending across EU countries  
(2014, % GDP, Sum of public consumption and public investment) 
 
             Source: Eurostat, National Accounts. 
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Figure 2 Responses of GDP after a shock in public spending 
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Table 1 Public spending multipliers 
 
QUARTER 1 QUARTER 2 QUARTER 4 QUARTER 8 
Latvia 0.05 0.06 -0.28 -1.80 
Estonia -0.03 -0.12 -0.36 -1.32 
Belgium -0.01 -0.14 -0.46 -0.84 
United Kingdom -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.40 
Ireland -0.01 0.07 0.12 -0.29 
Romania 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.09 
Denmark 0.01 -0.09 -0.27 0.01 
Bulgaria -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14 
Austria -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 0.15 
Czech Republic 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.29 
Cyprus 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.45 
Poland 0.03 0.08 0.25 0.63 
Slovak Republic 0.04 0.12 0.27 0.63 
Portugal 0.04 0.10 0.30 0.66 
Malta 0.07 0.17 0.41 0.78 
Hungary 0.05 0.15 0.40 0.94 
Netherlands -0.11 -0.08 0.35 1.49 
Italy 0.02 0.15 0.60 1.58 
Spain 0.06 0.20 0.67 1.63 
France 0.04 0.10 0.40 1.66 
Slovenia 0.16 0.42 0.95 1.80 
Luxemburg 0.06 0.34 0.90 2.09 
Sweden 0.22 0.47 0.95 2.86 
Finland 0.62 1.10 1.99 3.52 
Germany 0.37 0.83 2.10 4.37 
                           *Countries are ordered in ascending order of the public investment multiplier. 
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Figure 3 Real short term interest rate (%, 2007) 
 
                Source: AMECO. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Real short term interest rate (%, 2014) 
 
              Source: AMECO. 
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Figure 5 Real long term interest rate (%, 2014) 
 
               Source: AMECO. 
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Table 2 System GMM Econometric Estimates (Baseline results) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Public spending 
0.001 
(0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.70) 
-0.005* 
(-1.68) 
-0.006 
(-1.45) 
Short run interest rate  
-0.003** 
(-2.79) 
-0.002 
(-1.43) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
Public spending* 
Short run interest rate 
  
-0.023** 
(-2.24) 
-0.027** 
(-2.05) 
Private investment    
0.006** 
(3.34) 
Constant 
-0.013 
(-0.21) 
0.072 
(1.26) 
0.120 
(1.61) 
0.035 
(0.29) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
21.40 
(0.31) 
20.91 
(0.28) 
17.29 
(0.43) 
12.97 
(0.67) 
Autocor. Test (p-
value)
††† 
-0.15 
(0.88) 
-0.34 
(0.73) 
-1.19 
(0.23) 
-1.58 
(0.11) 
Observations 308 301 301 301 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.    
†† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in the regression are valid.  
††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit no second order  
serial correlation. 
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10 level. 
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Table 3 System GMM Econometric Estimates (different econometric specifications) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP   
 
Trade Taxes 
Tertiary 
schooling 
Lagged 
GDP 
Lagged 
growth 
rate 
Number of 
instruments 
as lags 
Endogenous 
private 
investment 
Lagged 
interest 
rate 
Public 
spending  
-0.003 
(-1.13) 
-0.006 
(-1.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.78) 
-0.006 
(-1.48) 
-0.004 
(-1.31) 
-0.003 
(-1.02) 
0.0008 
(0.18) 
-0.006** 
(-2.37) 
Short run 
interest rate 
0.002 
(0.96) 
0.0009 
(0.29) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.003 
(1.18) 
0.002 
(0.80) 
-0.0003 
(-0.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
Public 
spending* 
Short run 
interest rate 
-0.023** 
(-2.49) 
-0.031** 
(-2.01) 
-0.018** 
(-2.31) 
-0.026** 
(-2.16) 
-0.024** 
(-2.57) 
-0.018** 
(-2.67) 
-0.015* 
(-1.88) 
-0.026** 
(-2.37) 
Private 
investment 
0.006** 
(3.28) 
0.005** 
(2.46) 
0.0009 
(0.39) 
0.007** 
(3.35) 
0.007** 
(3.62) 
0.006** 
(3.39) 
0.005** 
(3.00) 
0.002* 
(1.90) 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
-0.008 
(-0.94) 
       
Taxes (% of 
GDP) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.71) 
      
Tertiary 
school 
enrollment 
rate 
  
0.001** 
(2.48) 
     
Lagged once 
GDP 
   
0.002 
(0.64) 
    
Growth rate 
of GDP (-1) 
    
-0.031 
(-0.08) 
   
Constant 
-0.034 
(-0.49) 
0.086 
(0.54) 
-0.023 
(-0.26) 
-0.011 
(-0.09) 
-0.032 
(-0.33) 
-0.034 
(-0.40) 
-0.115 
(-0.83) 
0.109 
(1.64) 
Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test 
(p-value)†† 
10.48 
(0.78) 
12.47 
(0.64) 
8.76 
(0.84) 
12.15 
(0.66) 
11.72 
(0.70) 
14.27 
(0.97) 
15.57 
(0.48) 
12.88 
(0.68) 
Autocor. Test 
(p-value)††† 
-1.80 
(0.07) 
-1.58 
(0.11) 
-1.42 
(0.15) 
-1.61 
(0.11) 
-0.99 
(0.32) 
-1.70 
(0.09) 
-1.25 
(0.21) 
-1.57 
(0.11) 
Observations 294 301 247 301 301 301 301 300 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.   †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in 
the regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression 
exhibit no second order serial correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 System GMM Econometric Estimates (Long run interest rate) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP   
 
Initial 
specification 
Trade Taxes 
Tertiary 
schooling 
Lagged 
GDP 
Lagged 
growth 
rate 
Number of 
instruments 
as lags 
Endogenous 
private 
investment 
Public 
spending  
-0.007* 
(-1.79) 
-0.007** 
(-2.35) 
-0.007* 
(-1.82) 
-0.004 
(-1.22) 
-0.005 
(-1.14) 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.005 
(-1.50) 
Long run 
interest rate 
-0.005 
(-1.50) 
-0.006* 
(-1.68) 
-0.005 
(-1.26) 
-0.003 
(-1.02) 
-0.004 
(-1.22) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.003 
(-0.88) 
-0.003 
(-1.33) 
Public 
spending* 
Long run 
interest rate 
-0.023** 
(-2.01) 
-0.022 
(-1.39) 
-0.021** 
(-2.09) 
-0.026* 
(-1.73) 
-0.017* 
(-1.83) 
-0.026 
(-1.30) 
-0.006 
(-0.64) 
-0.014** 
(-2.36) 
Private 
investment 
0.002 
(1.41) 
0.004 
(1.28) 
0.002 
(1.45) 
0.0007 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(1.10) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.0006 
(0.30) 
0.002 
(1.00) 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
 
-0.00002 
(-0.08) 
      
Taxes (% of 
GDP) 
  
-0.0003 
(-0.24) 
     
Tertiary 
school 
enrollment 
rate 
   
0.0001 
(0.19) 
    
Lagged once 
GDP 
    
0.006 
(0.81) 
   
Growth rate 
of GDP (-1) 
     
0.297 
(0.64) 
  
Constant 
0.146 
(1.30) 
0.106 
(0.80) 
0.151 
(1.19) 
0.099 
(0.65) 
0.031 
(0.36) 
0.098 
(0.55) 
0.026 
(0.37) 
0.097 
(0.84) 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test 
(p-value)†† 
11.74 
(0.76) 
16.34 
(0.36) 
10.86 
(0.76) 
16.54 
(0.28) 
12.68 
(0.62) 
9.29 
(0.86) 
17.50 
(0.91) 
16.42 
(0.42) 
Autocor. Test 
(p-value)††† 
-1.15 
(0.25) 
-0.95 
(0.34) 
-1.08 
(0.28) 
-1.03 
(0.30) 
-0.88 
(0.37) 
-0.12 
(0.90) 
-0.24 
(0.81) 
-0.70 
(0.48) 
Observations 300 293 300 247 300 300 300 300 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.   †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in 
the regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression 
exhibit no second order serial correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant  at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 5 System GMM Econometric Estimates  
(public consumption-public investment) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 (1 ) (2 ) (3)  
Public consumption 
-0.008** 
(-2.48) 
-0.010** 
(-2.21) 
-0.007** 
(-2.17) 
Public investment 
0.011 
(1.28) 
0.005 
(0.68) 
0.005 
(0.83) 
Short run interest rate 
0.002 
(0.68) 
-0.002 
(-0.71) 
0.003 
(1.35) 
Public spending* 
Short run interest rate 
-0.022** 
(-3.72) 
  
Public consumption* 
Short run interest rate 
 
-0.033** 
(-3.39) 
 
Public investment* 
Short run interest rate 
  
-0.036** 
(-6.11) 
Private investment 
0.003 
(1.17) 
0.003 
(1.14) 
0.002 
(1.09) 
Constant 
0.059 
(0.57) 
0.136 
(1.48) 
0.094 
(1.04) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
7.49 
(0.94) 
12.34 
(0.65) 
5.22 
(0.99) 
Autocor. Test (p-value)
††† -1.48 
(0.14) 
-1.56 
(0.12) 
-2.25 
(0.02) 
Observations 301 301 301 
              † The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.    
      †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in the regression are valid.  
    ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit no 
 second order serial correlation.  
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant  at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 System GMM Econometric Estimates  
(different growth regimes) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 (1 ) (2 ) (3)  
Public spending 
-0.0008 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
Short run interest rate 
0.003 
(0.89) 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
-0.002 
(-1.31) 
Public spending* 
Short run interest rate*Low 
growth regime  
-0.018** 
(-2.06) 
  
Public spending* 
Short run interest 
rate*Medium growth 
regime  
 
-0.047 
(-0.76) 
 
Public spending* 
Short run interest rate*High 
growth regime  
  
-0.035 
(-1.60) 
Private investment 
0.006** 
(3.98) 
0.004 
(1.53) 
0.002 
(1.01) 
Constant 
-0.096 
(-0.99) 
-0.040 
(-0.52) 
-0.007 
(-0.10) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
13.01 
(0.67) 
19.63 
(0.24) 
17.83 
(0.33) 
Autocor. Test (p-value)
††† -1.30 
(0.19) 
-0.49 
(0.62) 
-1.19 
(0.23) 
Observations 301 301 301 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. †† The null hypothesis is that  
      the instruments used in the regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that  
      the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit no second order serial  
      correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 6 Growth impact of public spending  
at various levels of the short term interest rate 
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